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 In 1994, Pierre Lévy published a short piece called “La Lecture artificielle” in Azimuts, 
translated three years later by Roxanne Lapidus for a SubStance special issue on 
“Metamorphoses of the Book.” Better known for his work on collective intelligence, published 
in the same year as “La Lecture artificielle,” Lévy’s article, nonetheless, stands out as an early 
example of a particular kind of criticism concerning itself with the relationship between 
technology and reading. Just over twenty years later, I wish to return to some of the assertions 
Lévy makes in that piece, re-contextualizing them in the light of more recent developments on 
“metamorphoses of the book,” and, perhaps more importantly, in relation to the current—and 
potential—metamorphoses of the reader. 
 
Artificial Reading I: “Artificial Reading” 
 
 Pierre Lévy’s “Artificial Reading” is predicated upon the idea that all reading is artificial. 
This does not mean, however, that he asserts that reading is not “neutral” or “natural,” a 
culturally-specific and learned, rather than innate, activity; rather, he is arguing that reading 
involves the production of an artifice. He begins. “We read a text. What is happening?” (12), 
and proceeds to outline the ways in which reading is informed by absences: the spaces between 
words, the fragments we do not comprehend, the ways in which readers “take the sparse, 
spread-out members that are dispersed on the surface of the pages or in the linearity of 
discourse, and [. . .] sew them together” (12). From this, he argues, comes meaning: “The space 
of meaning does not pre-exist reading. It is in traveling over it, in mapping it, that we create it” 
(12). Like other critics who have changed the landscape of literary studies, perhaps especially 
Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida, Lévy sees in the text not a fundamental unity that builds 
meaning through reading, but an intrinsic disunity that gives rise to something else: 
 
Here it is no longer the unity of the text that is at stake, but the construction of the self [. . .]. It 
is no longer the meaning of the text that occupies us, but the direction and elaboration of our 
own thinking, the clarification of our world view, the outcome of our projects, the awakening 
of our pleasures, the thread of our dreams. (12-13) 
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Lévy skirts the ways in which the reader appropriates the text, where “reading” is the 
interaction between text and reader, and “meaning” is a result, always contingent, of this 
interaction. This is not reading in the sense of an exegesis of the text, an annotation or 
summarization of what it contains, a direct correlation between textual elements and 
interpretations, but an act of (ongoing) construction of the relationship between the text and the 
reader, a record of the experience of reading rather than a final and complete reading in and of 
itself. 
 Lévy’s point, however, is not to rehearse poststructuralist ideas, nor, to a lesser degree, 
reader-response criticism, but to show how a particular emergent literary practice has always 
already been encoded in the reading experience: 
 
Up to this point, you haven’t yet read the word hypertext. Nonetheless, this is exactly what 
we’re talking about. Intellectual technologies nearly always exteriorize and reify a cognitive 
function, a mental activity. In so doing, they reorganize the intellectual economy or ecology in 
its entirety, and in turn modify the cognitive function that it was supposed to simply aid or re-
inforce. (13, italics in original) 
 
For Lévy, then, hypertext is the logical result of, “the already age-old process of artificialization 
of reading” (14). It is a way of thinking as much as a particular textual form, a mental operation 
that merely finds a manifestation in the technological affordances of a new medium: 
 
If reading consists of selecting, of schematizing, of constructing a network of cross-references 
internal to the text, of making associations with other givens, of integrating words and pictures 
with a personal memory that is under perpetual reconstruction, then hypertextual operations 
truly constitute a reification, a kind of exteriorization of the processes of reading. (14) 
 
From here, he concludes that digital technologies remove the text’s “clear boundaries,” its 
“definable interiority,” until it is no longer a discrete object, but one of many nodes in an 
expansive network, a “semantic map, accessible from anywhere, to which each person can 
contribute” (15). As a result: 
 
Interpretation—the production of meaning—no longer harks back to the interiority of an 
intention, nor to hierarchies of esoteric meaning, but, rather, relies on the still singular 
appropriation of a navigator. Meaning emerges from the effects of local pertinence. It emerges 
at the intersection of a de-territorialized semiotic map and a goal of efficiency or pleasure. I am 
no longer interested in what an unlocatable author thought; I ask the text to make me think, here 
and now. (15, italics in original) 
 
Lévy’s essay, when placed within the context of the then nascent field of hypertext criticism, 
reads as a call to appreciate the ways in which hypertext, so radically new in technological 
terms, is effectively old in terms of human thinking—it is how we have always read texts 
methodologically. 
 Whilst one might take issue with this, or at least argue that this is an oversimplification of 
the (historically-determined) processes of reading, we can see in this piece an early incarnation 
of the various strands that have come to dominate the critical field at the intersection between 
literary studies and new media technologies since: the ways in which the digital is a mediation 
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or re-mediation of former print technologies and reading practices (and its converse, that it is a 
radical break); the spatializing of the text, and the reader as navigator; what “reading” means in 
a digital age. 
 
Artificial Reading II: “Artificial” Reading? 
 
 As in the English term “reading,” however, there is potential ambiguity in Lévy’s “La 
Lecture.” It is not a performance dominated by artifice, or an artificial (as opposed to “natural”) 
reading, but a statement that reading is always already artificial. Yet, after twenty years of 
developments in computer hardware, in which processing power has increased exponentially, 
with vastly increased numbers of transistors (“Moore’s Law,” loosely meaning that computing 
power will increase twofold every two years), better hardware architecture, and the 
development of multi-core processors, the landscape has changed dramatically. It is no longer 
just a matter of what we read on the screen (rather than in print) having an impact upon or 
reifying existing reading practices, but the very nature of how we can “read” texts through 
artificial means. Contra Lévy, this is “artificial” reading in the sense that there is no meaning 
generated by the reading process, but instead the creation of an abstract dataset that can be used 
to further understand the processes which go into the make-up of the text. 
 The most overt way in which computers have changed how we (can) read is evident in the 
application of that raw processing power to the field of corpus analysis. Sifting through many 
millions of words of text, computer programs can identify statistical patterns and correlations 
within large corpora and, where relevant, perform a form of analysis on a given text to see how 
it compares to other texts. Many language departments around the world now offer courses in 
such software packages in order to teach students how computers can identify patterns in large 
amounts of material, a task that computers are obviously more suited to doing than people. But 
this “analysis” is not what most literary scholars would call analysis, and the “readings” 
generated are not tightly-constructed prose arguments that elucidate problems in the text, 
identifying shifting ideologies and ideological affiliations, or interpretations linking textual 
elements to contextual or biographical markers. Instead, such programs produce lists, diagrams, 
and graphs showing concordances of words (word usages and frequencies) within particular 
texts; they identify linguistic patterns and collocations; and, through the use of semantic 
tagging, they pinpoint recurrences or patterns drawn from different discourse areas. 
 Franco Moretti’s work, especially Graphs, Maps, Trees (2007), has provoked much debate 
about what constitutes “reading” using such digital tools. Although his work moves away from 
corpus analysis, it nevertheless sees literary texts as data, and, in so doing, offers various 
insights into literary history, whether charting the multiple “rises” in the novel based upon the 
publication trends of new books, suggestively demonstrating “generations” of genres, or 
re-imagining characters as vertices in network diagrams of interrelations. For Moretti, 
computers are a powerful tool for interpretative practices precisely because they can parse more 
data more quickly than a human reader and so produce more “complete” readings of literary 
historical trends than an inevitably partial human account. To his opponents, however, this very 
sense of completion is flawed, derived as the information must be from often incomplete 
datasets, and denying its own partiality of approach. Moretti is opposed to “close reading,” 
preferring instead the notion of “distant reading,” but to such opponents, even his graphs, maps, 
  
Artificial Reading (Mk II)  95     
 
and trees remain open to interpretation, given that any statistical evidence is qualitatively 
interpreted.
1
 
 
Reading the Artificial I: Plot Bots... 
 
 In addition to providing opportunities for interpretation, computing technologies also 
facilitate writing, and in a New Scientist article entitled “Plot Bots,” Simon Parkin reports on 
programs that are currently learning how to write stories. Mentioning some of the ongoing 
projects in computer authorship, such as the What-If Machine and Scheherazade, the piece 
suggests that the role of the author can be separated out into discrete programmable elements. 
The most problematic element, for Parkin’s interviewees, is making the stories interesting. 
Scheherazade poses questions in online forums—the example used is what happens when two 
characters meet in a restaurant—and then utilizes the responses to construct a plausible 
narrative. The What-If Machine generates a list of “what if’ questions to act as springboards 
into story creation, to try to create interesting premises for plots; examples from the “Utopian 
and Dystopian” section include, “What if the world suddenly had lots more generals? Then 
there would be more munitions, since generals command the armies that require munitions,” 
and from “Metaphors,” “What if august leaders were to lose their power, develop quirks and 
become unwanted misfits?” 
 But to call such programs “plot bots” is fundamentally accurate, because such programs are 
predicated upon the assumption that an interesting premise makes for an interesting story. They 
have no understanding of “interesting” past what is defined for them as being of interest and 
are, at best, digital homunculi of Russian formalists, breaking stories down into component 
pieces and trying to stitch them together. Part of the problem, perhaps, is that the programmers 
themselves are addressing a challenge, rather than trying to write a story. To use the example of 
Tony Veale, who works on the What-If Machine Project: “A story about a CEO who becomes 
chairman of a company is filled with plausible similarity, as CEOs are very similar to 
chairpersons [. . .]. But where is the tension? A story about an arrogant CEO who loses 
everything and becomes a bum? Now that’s interesting” (qtd. in Parkin 49). Such assumptions 
miss the fact that defining a narrative as “interesting” is of very little worth to anything but the 
most simplistic of reading practices, given that the most boring premise might be turned into a 
fascinating narrative through how it is narrated and situated, and equally that the most 
innovative plot idea can be turned into the most turgid of stories if narrated badly. To use J.R.R. 
Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings (1937-1949) as an example, there comes a point relatively 
early on in the narrative arc where all the elements have been laid out and most readers will 
“know” that the ring of power will be destroyed by the end of the books. This does not stop 
them from reading, and this is broadly true of whether an ending confirms or thwarts a reader’s 
expectations; it is how the reader traverses the story that is important, and whether there is 
enough to the unfolding of the plot to hold the reader’s attention. Thus in the case of the The 
Lord of the Rings, narrative tension is not the result of the plausibility or implausibility of the 
                                            
1 As Franco Moretti himself outlines at the conclusion of one of the foundational articles of Graphs, Maps, Trees, published in 
New Left Review: “I began this article by saying that quantitative data are useful because they are independent of interpretation; 
then, that they are interesting because they demand an interpretation; and now, most radically, we see them challenge existing 
interpretations” (“Graphs, Maps, Trees: Abstract Models for Literary History—1,” §XI, italics in original). For some initial 
responses to Moretti’s work, see the editors Jonathan Goodwin and John Holbo in Reading Graphs, Maps, Trees (2005). 
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plot, but instead the desire of readers to work through various scenes in order to arrive at, at 
least in terms of the basic quest narrative, a point they already knew was coming. 
 If “interest” is a central assumption behind the What-If Machine, Scheherazade operates on 
a different assumption, since it is primarily concerned with plausibility and causation. To 
reproduce in part the story written by Scheherazade, Parkin’s article quotes: 
 
With sweaty palms and heart racing, John drove to Sally’s house for their first date. Sally, her 
pretty white dress flowing in the wind, carefully entered John’s car. John and Sally drove to the 
movie theatre. John and Sally parked the car in the parking lot. Wanting to feel prepared, John 
had already bought tickets to the movie in advance. (47) 
 
The extract goes on in this manner for another few sentences, until we reach the (quoted) 
conclusion: “Sally stood up to use the restroom during the movie, smiling coyly at John before 
that exit” (47). Scheherazade might be able to crowd-source the plot problems, but its namesake 
is, I imagine, turning in her fictional, infinitely-deferred grave at this point.
2
 
 This is evidence of impressive programming, but it is far from impressive storytelling. It is 
like a precocious child’s attempt at a story, with less imagination and more concern for 
causation. There is what would be called a heavy-handed use of adjectives were it written by a 
human—“to make the story interesting to read,” as children are often told by teachers. There is 
a flat tone and repetitious focus on either John, or Sally, or both (with the addition of a potential 
problem of how many agents it takes to park a car). There is, basically, a lack of anything to 
engage the reader beyond the plot, which is itself somewhat mundane.
3
 Narration, perspective, 
structure, and pacing are not concepts understood by this program, and so the story lacks 
sophistication; it is procedural, with no concern for anything else. This does not mean that it is 
not a story, only that it is a story that makes the reader wonder why they have bothered to read it 
in the first place. 
 My concern here, in terms of programs such as the What-If Machine and Scheherazade, is 
that computer scientists are, like the systems they program, parsing stories. This makes sense 
for programmers, as each element is broken down into constituent parts and then compiled 
together to create the whole. But the question remains: what are the constituent parts of a story? 
Even within the discipline of literary studies, there is not a common consensus. Most of us are 
happy to talk about the notions of fabula and syuzhet; narrative voice, perspective, and 
focalization; language and linguistic structures; prolepsis, analepsis, and metalepsis; mood, and 
to a lesser extent, duration; form and genre; and linear versus non-linear narratives. There are 
obviously many more. But even these terms are contested, extended, contextualized, 
appropriated, adapted, re-appropriated, and utilized to greater and lesser extents over the 
history of reading, and as much as some insights remain fashionable, others change in a 
complex web of interactions between all the possible elements of a story—and that is only the 
stories that have been written so far. New media narratives have led to a reappraisal of some of 
the above, but more often than not this is a re-inflection rather than a rebuttal, and often such 
                                            
2 Some readers might be interested to know that the story continues after the excerpt quoted by Simon Parkin, and that the full 
version of “Movie Date” can be found on the Scheherazade website. 
3 This is, of course, with the possible exception of the end of the section, where readers might well wonder what an initially 
demure Sally, with her virginal dress and her careful entering of the car, is suggesting to John with that coy look, although that 
is reading “outside” the story. 
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actions in and of themselves are more strategic than considered, in order to showcase the 
versatility of “new” media over “old” media.4 
 That is, it is a truth universally acknowledged that there is no universally acknowledged 
“truth” to plot construction, and that the very composite nature of a story, an amalgam of the 
type of notions listed above, means that whilst we can break down elements of individual 
stories, and even then try to group them together into loosely generic elements like poetic and 
prose forms, there is no narrative outside of its narration, no Platonic form, or uber- or 
meta-story behind them. For all the instances of resonances, cross-overs, and adaptations 
throughout history in terms of specific stories, perhaps the only description that adumbrates all 
possibilities (which it would be important for a program to be able to do in order to function as 
the “best” storyteller were that phrase not at least twice as ridiculous as it sounds) is that “story” 
is the short-hand reference term for something that gets a reader from point A to point B, 
wherever, whenever, and however points A and B occur. In other words, it is the specific ways 
of how that is achieved, taking into account culture, language, media, and many other 
considerations, that are of most “interest” to readers. 
 To express it still more simplistically, there is no universal framework for a story, and what 
makes a story “interesting” to readers is through the telling as much as what is being told, the 
contexts in which the telling and what is told occur.
5
 Even structural narratologists and 
formalists do not codify stories and story elements in the ways that programmers do in order for 
their programs to be able to “write.” Even if the most extreme structural narratologists and 
formalists were to sit down together to identify the various elements and attempt to compile 
them, the result would be complexity not simplicity, not a simple formula of “plot + narration = 
story,” but an emergent interaction between all the possible ways of telling (an unquantifiable 
variable) with all the possible types of story (another unquantifiable variable), within all the 
cultural, generic, linguistic, and historical frameworks for a story (which are impossible to 
quantify and codify individually). Although I would argue that John and Sally’s escapades do 
form a story and would acknowledge that it is at least in part written by a computer program, 
that does not make it worth reading for anything but the value of seeing how a computer 
program “attempts” (a verb assuming volition, I admit) to move a reader from point A to point 
B.
 
 
Reading the Artificial II: ... and Script Generators 
 
 Such issues are reminiscent of another story that I find my thinking on the subject returning 
to, Philippe Vasset’s ScriptGenerator©®™. Vasset’s first novel and his only work to date to be 
translated into English, ScriptGenerator©®™ attracted comparatively little attention at the 
time and has fallen under the radar of most critics working at the intersection of literature and 
new media. It is ostensibly about a geologist who uncovers a manual outlining a secret software 
package that can create and market stories, and the narrative is split between two kinds of 
chapter: “commodification” chapters (called things like “Diamond,” “Cotton,” “Natural Gas,” 
                                            
4 For more on this, see Will Slocombe, “Techno-Babel: Re-Pre-Positioning Narratives and New Media.” 
5 Raymond Queneau’s Exercises in Style (1947) is a case in point here, telling the same mundane story in ninety-nine different 
ways. Matt Madden’s 99 Ways to Tell a Story: Exercises in Style (2006) is an adaptation of this concerned with graphic 
storytelling. Each text foregrounds the ways in which the telling of the story alters how the basic “plot” is perceived. 
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and “Maritime Freight Index”) and chapters from the manual of the eponymous software 
package, “ScriptGenerator©®™.” This manual is intended to both rationalize and “sell” the 
product, and contains phrases such as “narrative has finally become a raw material, a 
commodity. Therefore its treatment can be mechanised” (Vasset 5, emphasis in original) 
and “the author forms an essential part of the proposed content [. . .]. Using the 
ScriptGenerator©®™ database, you can produce the author you need to sell the product, and 
then employ an actor to incarnate the character” (71, emphasis in original). As the literal 
translation of the French title, “Display Copy,” reveals, however, there is something far more 
reflexive about the text: it emerges that, yes, this entire story is created by 
ScriptGenerator©®™, utilizing a basic quest-narrative framework—“investigator,” 
“sought-after object,” and “narrative units that link the one to the other” (29)—and that the 
story itself is part of the marketing campaign to foster consumer interest in the software. 
 For all its satire and cynicism, Vasset’s view of this commodification of narrative is not 
entirely inaccurate. Take for example, the following passages in which the manual discusses 
“creation” and “creatives” (one can well imagine Veale’s former uninteresting CEO being very 
interested at the thought of dismissing his “creatives”): 
 
It is ridiculous to allocate millions of dollars to the “creation” when this part of the production 
process can be replaced beneficially by a judicious and systematic recycling of two thousand 
years of narratives, maturing in libraries, archives, data bases. 
[. . ] 
The creative members of staff you employ—perhaps not for much longer—will tell you that 
such electronic enhancement kills innovation. We do not claim that it favours it, but we remind 
you that, commercially, novelty in itself counts for much less than the illusion of novelty. (6, 
19) 
 
Using computers to search for patterns can throw up some intriguing results. Recently, for 
example, three computer science researchers (Ashok et al.) have created a program that can 
predict whether a work will be a “bestseller” with 84% accuracy, through the analysis of its 
writing style. Despite The Telegraph’s lauding of the results—“Scientists find secret to writing 
a best-selling novel”—and despite some issues about assumptions behind and within the 
research (such as what constitutes success in the long- and short-terms, and whether that is the 
same as “merit,” however that is quantified), their results should force a reconsideration of the 
ways in which style can play a role in success. If computer programs that are beginning to learn 
to write exist, such as the What-If Machine and Scheherazade, those that attempt to determine 
literary marketability are also becoming more significant. 
 Albeit through the filter of research rather than economics, it is useful to compare Vasset’s 
fictional ScriptGenerator©®™ software with projects like the What-If Machine: 
 
In Computational Creativity research, we study how to engineer software which can take on 
some of the creative responsibility in arts and science projects. There has been much progress 
towards the creative generation of artefacts of cultural value such as poems, music and 
paintings. Often, when produced by people, such artefacts embed a fictional idea invented by 
the creator [. . .]. While such ideation is clearly central to creativity, with obvious applications 
to the creative industries, there have only been a few small, ad-hoc studies of how to automate 
fictional ideation. The time is therefore ripe to see whether we can derive, implement and test 
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novel formalisms and processes which enable software to not only invent, but assess, explore 
and present such ideas. (“Project Overview,” italics mine) 
 
Programs taking on “creative responsibility” and the automation of “fictional ideation” in order 
to “explore and present such ideas” sound remarkably like the fictional ScriptGenerator©®™. 
It is an early (in the sense of a prototype) program for identifying plot areas that might be of 
interest to readers, and one can easily imagine the software behind this being used to form part 
of a larger package in the future that looks remarkably like ScriptGenerator©®™. 
 However, the intent behind the What-If Machine is ostensibly less cynical than Vasset’s 
imagined software package: whereas ScriptGenerator©®™ is an allegory for the conservative 
recycling of already existing narratives (the premise being that “the illusion of novelty” is all 
that is required to market a text), alongside a denigration of the role of the author, the What-If 
Machine is intended to generate surprising and counter-intuitive results to encourage the 
creation of new ideas based on a re-appraisal of the familiar.
6
 To this end, Veale’s “Running 
with Scissors” explores the value of the cut-up technique, exemplified by William Burroughs, 
as a generative process: 
 
Creative producers are masters of ambiguity. They make the most of the ambiguity in their 
inputs, and induce ambiguity in their outputs to foster indeterminism and the emergence of 
new, unexpected meanings. The cut-up technique is designed to unleash the latent ambiguity in 
an otherwise business-as-usual text, such as a news story or a well-thumbed novel. (7) 
 
 For Veale, this procedure goes to the heart of the issue of the What-If Machine, which is not 
coded to produce semantically polished, culturally-accurate prose, but to generate questions 
that demand participation in order to resolve them: 
 
Consider < dictator; suppress; critic >, a triple which captures the widespread belief that 
dictators censure their critics, or worse. A system that also believes that < critic; criticize; 
artist> and < artist; produce; art > may well construct an inferential chain from dictators to art 
via critics and artists, to infer that dictators indirectly promote art by thwarting the critics that 
impede its producers. Such a chain embodies a surprising claim, that more dictators lead to 
more art, but it is predicated on several acts of sophistry. (8, italics in original) 
 
As Veale sees it, what is interesting is not that this sophistry is inaccurate, however, but that it 
embodies the potential for “inference chains [. . .] to be surprising in ways that make us think 
about what we know” (8): 
 
This friction poses a challenge to an audience—how can this be so?—that must be resolved 
meaningfully, either by accepting the conclusion at face value or by identifying the sophistry at 
its heart. In either case, the audience is aware of both the friction and its resolution; indeed, the 
resolution actively draws our attention to the friction, and draws us into its worldview. (9, 
italics in original) 
                                            
6 With similarly laudable aims about breaking down the barriers between humans and machines, Mark Reidl of the online 
Scheherazade project has stated that, “My goal as a researcher is to instill computers with narrative intelligence—the ability to 
craft, tell, and understand stories based on human reactions. In doing so, I hope to make computers better communicators, 
educators, entertainers and more capable of relating to us by genuinely understanding our needs” (“Why Artificial Intelligence 
Should Read and Write Stories,” italics in original). In this instance, however, it is about familiarizing our actions for 
machines. 
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Far from being a sinister attempt to remove authors from their roles, then, Veale and his 
colleagues at work on the What-If Machine are attempting to use an automated version of the 
“cut-up” to generate new ideas and new thinking. It is, to over-generalize, a form of 
counter-factual historicism applied to ideas and concepts; we might learn something new from 
it, but it is very hit and miss about whether it works or not. 
 Yet it must be observed, we are still talking here about intent. Veale intends the What-If 
Machine in one way, whereas the mysterious creators of ScriptGenerator©®™ intend their 
system to be used in another way. In fact, one of the problems that I would argue has 
contributed to Vasset’s ScriptGenerator©®™ being overlooked is in fact the issue of intent, as 
one reviewer notes: 
 
So what was the author’s intention in writing the book? It is clearly a savage parody of the 
commercialism of contemporary culture, and of the publishing industry’s role. It may have 
been an attempt to show the vapidity of the writers of currently popular fiction. It may have 
been an attempt to illustrate the corruptive values of a material society, so entranced with 
valuing products on the basis of cost effectiveness that it will soon move to absurd 
conclusions. It may also have been a diatribe aimed at fellow authors, who so closely attach 
themselves to the strategies of commodity-moving used by book publishers that they begin to 
write commercially-adapted stories as commodities. (Kohn) 
 
This question of “intent,” of acknowledging the book’s satirical nature but not being able to nail 
down its “point” prevails, towards a suspicion that, in “its parody of novel writing” (Kohn), the 
text’s failure to satisfy might be deliberate, but equally might not be. As Michel Faber’s online 
review of the novel—rather cruelly titled “the dearth of the author”—articulates: “It’s difficult 
to guess how good the narrative parts of the book, ostensibly generated by ScriptGenerator 
software, are intended to be. Characterisation is non-existent, espionage clichés are grafted on 
shamelessly. Some lines tempt us to identify them as parody” (italics mine). Faber’s conclusion 
that “Vasset understands the mindset and the machinations of the companies that own our 
planet; all he needs is proper characters and a story” is indicative of the way that the novel can 
feel unsatisfying at its close—rather like reading a story called “A Corporation’s Hostile 
Takeover of Narrative” by a more advanced version of Scheherazade. Vasset is either a genius 
at writing like a computer program or a bad writer; he is either a brilliant satirist, to such an 
extent that the book has failed to sell well (does this invalidate his point?), or a failed writer, 
according to such arguments. How are we to read not only ScriptGenerator©®™ as a text, but 
also interpret its place in the market, and why it has failed to attract much attention? 
 
The Artificial, Reading 
 
 If what I have said in the above sections is at all accurate, then computer programs (and 
their programmers) only identify story elements in isolation, at the expense of the whole, and 
there remains a larger concern. The broad definition, “something that gets a reader from point A 
to point B,” means that the story, as much as text has a phenomenological existence outside of 
the reader, only becomes story if it takes the reader somewhere, whether metaphorically or just 
getting them through a rainy day. There is something outside of the text (no misappropriations 
of Derrida, here, as counter-arguments) that we must take into account: the reader. If we 
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consider reading—perhaps a necessity given the importance that writing courses put on an 
awareness of reading and reading contexts—then the situation is obviously even more 
complicated. To return again to Tony Veale’s fictitious CEO, one can imagine a CEO very 
much enjoying the story of a CEO who becomes a chairperson, as it would “speak” to them in a 
way it would not to other readers, and if this “story” is classified as “biography” or 
“self-improvement,” then I can imagine quite a market for it. Equally, I can imagine that 
arrogant CEO, finding a copy of the riches-to-rags version, not being interested, and if they had 
already bottomed out, certainly not wanting to read about how it was probably their own fault 
anyway. “Interest” is as much in the eye of the beholder as it is in the narration of a plot. 
 If readers are as central to narrative construction as theorists such as Barthes assert, then 
another agent comes into play at this point, if we are to speculate on the future. To echo Lévy: 
up to this point, you haven’t yet read the words “artificial intelligence.” Nonetheless, this is 
exactly what I am talking about. In these models and processes of reading, in these 
much-vaunted claims for the death of the (human) author due to the ability of computers to 
process information and parse it more rapidly and efficiently than humans, we are seeing a 
denigration of the act of authorship, not least of which is concerned with—if they are to be 
deemed important still, anyway—politics, morality, dare I say responsibility. If we devalue the 
author to such an extent that they are merely a textual-production machine, an algorithm 
through which ideology, unconscious trauma, or whatever else might convert an input into an 
output, then they are little better than calculating machines. 
 This may of course be true; according to some types of readings, the role of the author is 
perhaps reduced to that of a throughput. Nevertheless, how many readings have been generated, 
especially since the birth of New Criticism and the decline of centrality of the author, which 
barely mention the author at all? I would imagine not that many, for most critics would 
acknowledge the author as a cultural or psychological agent or their Foucauldian “function,” 
even if they refuse to acknowledge the significance of authorial intent to a text. Yet, by 
ascribing a systematic program to what constitutes a story, computer scientists are indeed 
suggesting that the author is no more than data-parser and compiler, which the most ardent of 
poststructuralist critics would probably take issue with even as they talk about language 
speaking through the author. As literary critics, we might deny authorial intent, but we cannot 
deny the role of the author in the construction of the text, even when we cannot agree what that 
role is. 
 But let us not forget that Barthes asserts in his well-known critical essay “The Death of the 
Author” (1968) that “the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author” (148), 
and from that observation we can nuance the preceding sections; rather than a human reading a 
computer-generated story, what might happen when a computer “reads,” not just in the sense of 
parsing data and “comprehension,” but the generative process of creating a reading?7 Does the 
                                            
7  An early example of this “reading-AI” can be seen in Elaine Rich’s “Computing and the Humanities.” Despite the 
“primitive” state of AI in 1985, what I “read” in(to) her piece is not what it says, but the gulf between “reading” as a humanities 
scholar and “reading” as defined by a computer scientist (which Rich is), and the misapprehensions of each area towards the 
other that persist to this day. Rich thus usefully demonstrates an approach to “reading” that is predicated on problem-solving 
(that is, reading as comprehension for information to answer questions) rather than the construction of interpretations. Another 
early reading, this time of “Artificial Intelligence,” is David J. Bolter’s 1984 article, which somewhat presciently argues that 
“artificial intelligence will grow in importance as a way of looking at the human mind, regardless of the success of the 
programs themselves in imitating various aspects of human thought” (17). For him, the tendency for computer scientists to 
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death of the (human) author herald the advent of the (computer) reader? To my mind, this 
speculation is by no means idle, even if artificial intelligence is insufficiently advanced to act in 
this way currently. Computers have “read” for a while now, although they “read” in very 
different ways to humans. Aside from the computational linguistics aforementioned and 
Moretti’s use of graphs and computers to parse out data from stories, we can of course talk 
about examples of OCR (Optical Character Recognition), text recognition software, machine 
translation, and speech packages, although the ways in which these constitute different sense of 
“reading” can be debatable. To illustrate: ScriptGenerator©®™ is fictional, but it is designed to 
deal with large amounts of data—today’s “big data” industries spring to mind—to derive a 
sense of what is happening culturally, as the text’s definition of the cultural “zeitgeist” 
suggests: “ZEITGEIST, an index unique to ScriptGenerator©®™, features prominently in 
the profit and loss assessment. This index constantly measures the frequency with which 
themes, imagery and characters appear in the media or in a cultural context, and it allows you to 
integrate them in your productions” (52, emphasis in original). Vasset is being cynical again, 
but computers are far better than humans at pattern recognition and sifting through large 
amounts of data, and it is not too much of a stretch to assume that this kind of data mining of 
cultural outputs is not that far in the future. 
 As a result, if computer programs can learn to “data-mine” culture, and link to other 
programs that can construct syntactically meaningful sentences, and then to other programs that 
are more advanced “plot bots,” we arrive at a situation where programs are, indeed, “reading” 
culturally, and producing “readings.” If we then enter the realms of Science Fiction and attach 
sentience, or at least agency, onto such conglomerations of programs, we step further into the 
rabbit hole and see a time in which all our literary endeavors might be interpreted through 
computers acting as literary critics, or even programs writing stories that other programs read. It 
is between these two poles that I wish to devote what is left of the article—between computers 
“reading” encoded cultural data and computers producing “readings” of literary works. 
 The short form of this is to ask a question: if we are to create a sufficiently advanced 
program that could read literary works and write essays on them, would it merely be an 
“artificial” reading? If, as Lévy states, interpretation “relies on the still singular appropriation of 
a navigator” (15), what does it mean for a computer to “navigate” a text? To return to another of 
Lévy’s statements, re-contextualized from the conditional: “reading consists of selecting, of 
schematizing, of constructing a network of cross-references internal to the text, of making 
associations with other givens, of integrating words and pictures with a personal memory that is 
under perpetual reconstruction” (14).8 In literal terms, a computer program could achieve all 
this, and thus, according to Lévy, “read.” But its reading would not be a reading that we would 
necessarily recognize as such. As Moretti has shown, computer programs can enable us to 
                                                                                                                                       
“replicate” human cognition is much the same process as I am outlining here in their tendency to “replicate” stories, and I share 
his concerns about the existence of a blasé tendency to accept the assumptions of the model merely because such a model can 
be successfully programmed. 
8 This piece is obviously the product of both a directed search for sources and the happenstance of coming upon them, whether 
fictional, critical, or popular science and journalism. It is, also, the product of work that does not correspond to acts of reading; 
a response to a call; the creation of a new undergraduate module on “Ways of Reading,” looking at the different ways in which 
we can read a text (a literary theory module by another name); various articles in New Scientist, Scientific American, and the 
national press; arranging an event on Artificial Intelligence as part of a national festival of the humanities, Being Human; even 
biographical research into psychiatry and diagnostic criteria. And these are just some of the ones of which I am aware. 
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“read” in radically different ways and identify features of texts that we may not have noticed 
(and to somehow empirically “prove” the obvious, sometimes), but programs “read” in the 
manner in which they have been programmed: identifying particular elements of texts, 
keywords, and a multitude of other things that I have and have not mentioned above. They do 
not, and arguably cannot, traverse a text in the manner that Levy suggests, from initial thoughts 
and impressions to coherent and plausible interpretations.
9
 
There are many reasons for this. For instance, there is no self-reflection going on, even as 
the text itself is being searched in a sustained and thorough manner, and even if modifications 
are occurring within the program as it is shaped by what it is reading. And that, perhaps, is the 
difference—humans tend not to read by searching for patterns, at least on a conscious level, 
whereas programs do.
10
 When Lévy states that reading is more about “the direction and 
elaboration of our own thinking” (13) than it is about identifying the meaning of the text, a 
program would not read in such a manner, and neither could it “ask the text to make me think, 
here and now” (15, italics in original). This distinction is, in loose terminology, that between 
“closed” and “open” readings, where reading with a particular cultural or theoretical bias 
refuses to acknowledge areas of the text outside of that approach. Human critics can read like 
that, but they do not have to read like that. Moreover, a program could only produce a reading of 
something it was programmed to read, and then (presumably) not be able to forget it, as it would 
be incorporated into a vast textual reservoir of its database. It could not necessarily select a text 
to read, based on personal predilection, and neither could it then “forget” what it had read, only 
to resurface in unexpected and perhaps interesting ways later on. 
 This notion of different “readings,” of different ways of reading, is something that literary 
scholars are familiar with, from their own historical and theoretical awareness, and this, too, is 
something that a computer could (arguably) not achieve. Imagine a very well-programmed 
system, with a multitude of different theoretical approaches at its disposal, that is introduced to 
a new text. Users could ask it to generate a feminist reading, or a queer reading, or a 
postcolonial reading, even a deconstruction of the text, but that would still be closing down its 
options—even assuming that it would be possible to program the behaviors and expectations 
embodied by such approaches in the first place. The notion of a “complete” reading, imagining 
such a sufficiently advanced and extensive system, is anathema anyway. Such a program could 
relate minute amounts of detail of the author’s life (assuming it is recorded) with socio-political 
contexts at the time (assuming enough data), with versions and editions of the texts pre- and 
post-publication (assuming that they are kept), with prevailing literary trends past and present 
(to be fair, as Moretti observes, it would be less selective than a human reader); but it would still 
fail to be a complete reading of the text, if only because it would in so doing miss the partiality 
of approach that generates readings and counter-readings—a diehard narratologist would not, 
                                            
9 This is not to presume that Pierre Lévy is correct, and that there are no other ways of reading, but it is a useful illustration of 
the ways in which a program cannot read. 
10 Aside from the issue of whether such an artificial intelligence, were it to exist, would have a conscious versus unconscious 
mind, this notion of pattern-searching is debatable. After all, disciplines approach the matter of reading quite differently, and 
some are more system-oriented than others. To cite one example, Andrew Elfenbein has usefully explored the relationship 
between cognitive science and the history of reading, in an article of the same name. Whilst I disagree with some of his 
statements, the discussion about relationships between “online” and “offline” reading, concept activation, cohort activation, 
and standards of coherence do provide interesting ways of approaching the matter of “reading,” especially in terms of how 
programs and humans “read” differently. 
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indeed could not, interpret the text in the same way as a Marxist critic, and the two readings are 
mutually exclusive unless combined into a coherent reading, in which case they cease to be 
either Marxist or narratological but a blend of the two. 
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 All of which is to say, humans are not better at reading than computers, but neither are they 
worse. The purpose of reading, of generating readings and interpretations, is under threat, 
particularly in the increasingly technological and economic paradigms in which we “operate” (I 
cannot say “live” there). There is value, however, in reading differently; learning to 
accommodate other readings, whether generated by programs or people, is no bad thing. The 
advanced system posited above, reading texts in tandem with human readers, could generate 
new insights and new ways of approaching problems, because it would offer both systemic and 
qualitative approaches to texts, to culture, and to human experience. The tendency of 
programmers (and policy makers) to assume bigger (data) is better (data), that systems for 
meaning-making and reception might be better than individual acts of the same, suggest a 
culture attempting to eradicate its own humanity, a fetishization of the order of the machine at 
the expense of the meat. But as all good writers know, and quite a large number of critics, 
binaries are products of ways of thinking, not truths, and are there to be interrogated. All 
reading is artificial, says Lévy, yet he does not suggest that it is not fundamentally human. 
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